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LIMITS ON PARTY AUTONOMY IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
Giuditta Cordero-Moss*
INTRODUCTION
International contracts are often drafted in a rather
standardized manner, making use of so-called boilerplate clauses that
aim at regulating the interpretation and operation of the contract. In
addition, they often contain an arbitration clause that requires the
parties to submit all disputes arising out of or relating to the contract
to arbitration, thus excluding any involvement of national courts.
Standardised contract terms, including a boilerplate legal
framework for the contract and arbitration clauses, are elements that
seem to indicate an intention to render the contract self-sufficient. By
including a detailed and extensive regulation of the legal relationship
between the parties, the contract aims at making national law
dispensable. If national law is not relevant, and the only basis for
regulating the parties’ legal relationship is the contract, it becomes
possible and meaningful to standardise contract terms, even when
contracts are intended to be implemented in a variety of legal systems,
without the need to adapt them to the legal framework of the specific
transaction. The impression of self-sufficiency is enhanced by the
exclusion of national courts and the referral to arbitration instead. A
* Director of the Department of Private Law, Professor of Law at the
University of Oslo. I presented the main lines of this article at the International
Academy of Consumer and Commercial Law in Istanbul, July 2014. The article is
originally published in the Oslo Law Journal 2014 No. 1, and is reproduced here with
the consent of the publisher. The article was based on a paper that I presented at the
Arbitration Forum of the Center for Transnational Litigation, Arbitration and
Commercial Law, New York University, on February 3, 2014.
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closed circuit is created, dominated by the will of the parties: the
relationship is regulated by terms of contract agreed to by the parties,
and disputes are solved by a private body bound by the contractual
terms set forth by the parties. External sources, including national law,
may seem redundant.
Self-sufficiency may seem a realistic goal as long as the legal
relationship remains within the borders of the closed circuit. This
assumes that the legal relationship is, at any time, subject to the terms
and legal framework agreed between the parties.
There are, however, situations in which this assumption may
turn out not to be true. For example, if a difference arises between the
parties, and the parties disagree on what is the legal framework
(notwithstanding that they may have agreed in the past, prior to the
conflict); or if third parties’ interests or public interests are affected,
and mandatory rules or policies override the parties’ agreement; or if
the agreed terms or legal framework may be interpreted in more than
one way or need specification by external sources. In these situations,
the closed circuit is interrupted and recourse to external sources
becomes necessary. To a certain extent, guidance may be sought in
non-national, non-authoritative rules that may permit a uniform,
transnational solution and thus reinstate the closed circuit. Where such
a uniform guidance is not available, the closed circuit is interrupted
again. When a full closed circuit cannot be assumed, party autonomy
may be limited.
To assess the limits of party autonomy, it will be necessary to
analyse the above mentioned situations where interference with the
closed circuit may occur. Section II will briefly discuss to what extent
the legal framework provided by the contract and possibly given effect
to in arbitration may resist control and interference by national law;
Section III will discuss to what extent the terms of the contract are
capable of being interpreted in a uniform manner; Section IV will
discuss to what extent transnational sources may provide a uniform
legal framework capable of replacing national governing law; Section
V will investigate to what extent the principle of faithful interpretation
to the wording of the contract may be a guiding principle for arbitral
tribunals.
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EXTERNAL LIMITS TO PARTY AUTONOMY: COURT CONTROL

The closed circuit described above meets the expectations as
long as the arbitral tribunal gives effect to the will of the parties as
embodied in the contract and the award is complied with by the losing
party or enforced by the courts. The closed circuit fails when an arbitral
award becomes invalid or unenforceable as a consequence of having
given effect to the contract terms.
International arbitration is an alternative method of solving
contractual disputes that is based on the consent of the parties. If the
parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration, then the ordinary
courts will have to decline jurisdiction on those disputes, and the only
possible mechanism to solve the dispute will be the arbitration that has
been chosen by the parties. If, on the contrary, the parties have not
entered into an arbitration agreement, disputes between them will have
to be solved by the national court that has jurisdiction. An arbitral
tribunal, in other words, bases its existence upon the parties’
agreement. Moreover, the parties determine the composition of the
arbitral tribunal, the procedural rules that have to be followed by the
arbitral tribunal, the scope of the tribunal’s competence and its power.
The arbitral tribunal is bound to follow the instructions of the parties;
otherwise, it exceeds the power that the parties have conferred on it.
If the arbitral tribunal exceeds its power, neither its jurisdiction nor its
award are founded on the parties’ agreement, and there is,
consequently, no legal basis for either of the two. These basic elements
of arbitration are based on the 1958 New York Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 6,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, ratified by 155 countries1 and
are reflected in most national arbitration laws, as well as in the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
adopted in sixty-nine countries.2

1
For a list of ratifications, see UNCITRAL, Status Convention on the
Recognition
and
Enforcement
of
Foreign
Arbitral
Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_st
atus.html (last visited on June 19, 2015).
2
For a list of Model Law countries, see UNCITRAL, Status
UNCISTRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with
amendments
as
adopted
in
2006,
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Arbitration’s dependence on the parties’ will, which is so
uniformly recognised, is an important factor strengthening the opinion
that arbitration is a private matter between the parties, that the arbitral
tribunal is bound to follow the parties’ instructions, and that national
courts or state laws have no possibility of interfering with the parties’
will. This opinion is certainly confirmed by the observation that the
vast majority of arbitral awards are complied with voluntarily by the
losing party. The parties agree to submit the dispute to arbitration, then
they instruct the arbitral tribunal as to the scope of the dispute, the
rules to be applied, etc., then the losing party recognizes the
arbitration’s result and complies voluntarily with the award. In
situations such as this one, the totality of the arbitration takes place in
the private sphere of the parties. There is no point of contact between
the national courts and the arbitration. Consequently, no national
judge may decide to override the parties’ contract or expectations by
considering an agreement invalid due to violations of E.U. competition
law3 or a contract not binding due to one of the parties not having legal
capacity according to the law to which it is subject.4 The arbitrators
may or may not decide to apply these rules, but, as long as the losing
party accepts the result of the arbitration, there will be no possibility
for any judge to verify the arbitrator’s decision. In these cases,
therefore, limits to party autonomy are relevant only to the extent that
the parties request the arbitral tribunal apply state law or the tribunal
elects to do so on its own motion. When the losing party does not
voluntarily comply with the award, the courts will intervene. In these
cases, the closed circuit is interrupted and limitations to party
autonomy may become relevant.
The formal framework for arbitration grants it a relative
autonomy, which actually gives the appearance of an autonomous
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitr
ation_status.html (last visited June 19, 2015).
3
Violation of E.U. competition law is, according to a controversial ECJ
decision, to be deemed as a violation of ordre public and therefore prevents
enforcement of the award under the New York Convention. Case C-126/97, Eco
Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. I-03055.
4
That each of the parties’ own law governs their legal capacity, quite
irrespective of which law the parties chose to govern the contract, is regulated by the
New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law and was confirmed by the
Swedish Court of Appeal. Hovrätt (HOVR) (Court of Appeals) 2007-12-17 T310806 (Swed.); see KLUWER ARBITRATION, 6 ITA MONTHLY REPORT, MAY (2008).
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system. The main instrument upon which arbitration is founded, as
previously mentioned, is the New York Convention, that binds the
courts of these countries to recognise arbitration agreements and thus
dismiss claims that are covered by an arbitration agreement, as well as
to recognise and enforce arbitral awards without any review of the
merits or of the application of law – with only a restrictive and
exhaustive list of grounds to refuse recognition and enforcement.
UNCITRAL Model Law is also an important instrument, issued in
1985 and revised in 2006, which has contributed to a considerable
harmonisation of the areas of arbitration law that are not covered by
the New York Convention. The UNCITRAL Model Law is, in turn,
based on the same principles as the New York Convention, which
means that together these instruments create a harmonised legal
framework for arbitration. Both instruments give a central role to the
will of the parties. The power of the arbitral tribunal actually derives
from the agreement of the parties; therefore, the arbitral tribunal is
obliged to follow the parties’ instructions in respect of the scope of the
dispute, the law to be applied, and the remedies to be granted.
All this confirms, to a large extent, the understanding of
arbitration as an autonomous system, based on the will of the parties
and detached from national law. However, both the New York
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law refer to national, nonharmonised legislation in a number of instances and thus reduce in
few, but significant, respects the detachment of arbitration from
national laws. Thus, national law defines what may be subject to
arbitration, when an award is deemed to conflict with public policy,
what the criteria are for an arbitration agreement to be binding on the
parties, what mandatory rules of procedure apply, and when an award
is valid.5 In these situations, the closed circuit is interrupted.
For example, a contract between a Norwegian and a Ukrainian
party was submitted by the parties to Swedish law; after a dispute arose
and arbitration was initiated, the Ukrainian party maintained that it was
5
For a more extensive analysis, see Luca Radicati di Brozolo, International
Arbitration and Domestic Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
DIFFERENT FORMS AND THEIR FEATURES 40, 40-57 (Giuditta Cordero-Moss ed.,
2013); see also Giuditta Cordero-Moss, International Arbitration is Not Only International,
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, DIFFERENT FORMS AND THEIR
FEATURES 7, 7-39 (2013).
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not bound by the contract, because its representatives had signed the
contract in a way that did not meet the formal requirements of
Ukrainian law; the arbitral tribunal followed the choice of Swedish law
contained in the contract, considered the contract validly signed
according to Swedish law and disregarded Ukrainian law as irrelevant.
The arbitral tribunal, therefore, fulfilled the closed circuit; however, the
award was set aside by the courts of the country where it was rendered,
Sweden, because the legal capacity of a party is subject not to the law
chosen by the parties in the contract, but to the law of each of the
parties.6 The closed circuit was interrupted, and party autonomy
restricted.
In another example, the European Court of Justice found that
an award would be invalid and unenforceable for violation of public
policy if it gave effect to a contract that does not comply with
competition law.7 Had the arbitral tribunal been willing to follow the
terms of the contract in full, the award would not be valid or
enforceable; this is, therefore, another limitation to party autonomy.
Another example is a decision by a Russian court, refusing to
enforce an award that had given effect to a shareholders agreement
among the shareholders of a Russian company.8 The shareholders
agreement regulated the parties’ rights and obligations in a manner that
did not comply with Russian company law, and the court found that
enforcing the award would have violated Russian public policy. The
harmonised framework for arbitration is, therefore, subject to national
law in several significant respects, and this may have an impact on the

Hovrätt (HOVR) (Court of Appeals) 2007-12-17 T3108-06 (Swed.); see
Kluwer Arbitration, supra note 4. For a more extensive analysis, see Giuditta CorderoMoss, Legal Capacity, Arbitration and Private International Law, in CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERGENCE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – LIBER AMICORUM KURT SIEHR
(Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2010).
7
Eco Swiss China Time Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. I-03055.
8
[Ruling of the Western-Siberian District Commercial Court on March
31, 2006], No.F04- 2109/2005(14105-А75-11) (Rus.) (regarding an arbitral award on
a shareholder agreement between, among others, OAO Telecominvest, Sonera
Holding BV, Telia International AB, Avenue Ltd, Santel Ltd, Janao Properties Ltd
and IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd.).
6
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enforceability of arbitration agreements and of arbitral awards, which
in turn restricts the effects of party autonomy.9
II.

TERMS OF CONTRACT: ABSOLUTE AND UNIFORM
INTERPRETATION?

With the exceptions seen in Section 1, the liberal framework
for arbitration permits to recognise and enforce awards even if the
award were based on a wrong interpretation of the contract or of the
evidence, it applied the applicable law wrongly, or it applied the wrong
law. If the award gives effect to the regulation contained in the
contract, therefore, it will mostly be recognised and enforced even
though the contract may have disregarded and violated the applicable
law. Arbitration, therefore, to a large extent seems to permit relying on
the assumption of the closed circuit. This, however, does not imply
that party autonomy is absolute. An absolute party autonomy, not at
all affected by external elements, assumes that the terms of the contract
have a uniform meaning flowing from the words, and that they
therefore may be interpreted equally in all legal systems.
It is, however, not uncommon that contract terms need to be
understood in light of assumptions and effects founded on the
applicable legal framework. Even plain words may acquire different
meanings, depending on the culture and tradition of the interpreter.
Take an apparently self-explanatory expression such as “summer
nights.” If read by an Italian, it will create associations with a dark and
warm night, possibly with crickets singing and a sky full of stars. If read
by a Norwegian, it will evoke a bright and chilly night, with the sun as
the only visible star. If the meaning of plain words is affected by the
context, even more so it is for terms of a contract, as they refer not to
a natural phenomenon, but to legal effects that are created and
supported by legal systems, which in turn use words as the most

9
For a more extensive analysis of the matter, see GIUDITTA CORDEROMOSS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS ch. 5 (2014); see also Giuditta
Cordero Moss, International Arbitration and the Quest for the Applicable Law, 8 GLOBAL
JURIST 1 (2008). A research project at the University of Oslo analyses the limits that
this may impose on party autonomy. See UiO Dep’t of Private Law, The Fac. Of
Law, Arbitration and Party Autonomy (APA), (Nov. 17, 2009),
http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/choice-of-law/index.html .
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important means to create and define those legal effects. It then
becomes even more difficult to separate the legal effects from the
words used to express them. In this situation, it may be illusionary to
expect that the terms of a contract have an absolute meaning, fully
independent of any legal framework or legal tradition.
National legal systems may differ from each other in many
respects that are relevant to a contract, even when the systems belong
to the same legal tradition, so-called legal family. Even more so there
will be differences across legal families, such as the common law and
the civil law. Modern comparative law research is inclined to consider
this divide as overrated and largely overcome by a common core of
European contract law. The common core reveals a certain synchrony
between the systems on an abstract level, but it does not necessarily
lead to harmonised solutions on a specific level. 10 Awareness about a
common core may show that a certain principle may be recognised and
a certain result may be achieved in a plurality of legal systems, albeit by
employing different legal techniques. In a specific case, however, it is
the particular legal technique employed in the contract that counts, and
not the abstract possibility of achieving the desired result, if only the
right legal technique had been adopted.
A.

The Applicable Law’s Impact on Force Majeure Clauses

An example of term of contract that may have different legal
effects depending on the legal framework, is the so-called Force
Majeure clause. This clause is meant to excuse a party’s nonperformance of its obligation if fulfilment was prevented by an event
beyond that party’s control that was unforeseeable and could not be
reasonably overcome. One question is how the requirement of
“beyond the control” shall be interpreted. Interpretation may be

10
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW (Giuditta Cordero-Moss ed., 2011). This book is based

on a research project that I ran at the University of Oslo from 2004 to 2009, and
shows that the same contract wording may lead to diametrally different legal effects,
depending on the governing law. See, particularly, part 3 in the book, as well as the
Conclusion; see also INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch.
3.
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influenced by the legal system’s understanding of the assumptions for
liability.
An illustration of this situation is when a producer cannot fulfil
its obligations, because it did not receive raw materials from its
supplier. The question is whether failure by a party’s supplier may be
deemed as an event falling outside of that party’s sphere of control. To
answer this question, it is necessary to understand the purpose of the
Force Majeure clause.
There may be several different goals for regulations on
exemptions from liability for non-performance. In some legal systems,
the aim is to allocate between the parties the risk for supervening
unexpected events according to which one of the two parties is closer
to bear that particular risk. This approach assumes a strict liability,
triggered irrespective of the conduct of the party that was prevented
from performing its obligations.
According to an alternative approach, the risk for unexpected
events should not be borne by a party, as long as that party has acted
diligently and cannot be blamed for the occurrence of the impediment
- even if in an objective allocation of risk that party would be closer to
bear such risk.
The legal systems, that follow the criteria of the strict liability
and the allocation of risk between the parties according to the
respective spheres of control, would consider the choice of supplier to
be an event falling within the sphere of control of the seller. Certainly
this impediment would not fall within the sphere of the buyer and,
since all risks have to be allocated between the parties, it follows that
it must fall within the sphere of the seller. That the producer has been
diligent in selecting its supplier and cannot be blamed for the supplier’s
failure to deliver is not relevant. This is the approach taken by English
law.11
German law has a different approach. According to § 276
BGB, if the prevented party is to be blamed for the impediment or its
consequences, it cannot be excused from liability. If, however, the
EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT, ¶. 17064 (13th ed.
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011).
11
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prevented party can prove that it has not acted negligently, it will be
excused from liability. If the seller has operated with diligence in the
choice of supplier, it would not be considered liable for nonperformance due to failure by the supplier.
The distinction between Common Law and Civil Law in the
context of liability for non-performance can be explained with the
inclination of the English system to privilege predictability, for the sake
of ensuring that business is carried out smoothly, rather than ensuring
that an equitable justice is made in the specific case.12 Common Law
allocates the risk of non-performance between the parties according to
where it is most likely that the risk should be borne. This objective rule
is not to be defeated by subjective criteria such as lack of negligence,
because it would render the system less predictable. Civil Law systems
privilege (in different degrees) the subjective elements of the specific
case, in order to ensure that an equitable solution is reached.
Applied to the example made above, this means that the Force
Majeure clause may be understood differently under the different
governing laws. As a result, in a contract containing the same wording,
a producer who cannot fulfil its supply obligations due to failure by the
raw materials supplier, is not excused under English law,13 whereas he
is excluded under, for example, Norwegian law.14
B.

The Applicable Law’s Impact on Entire Agreement Clauses

Another example of term of contract that may be interpreted
differently depending on the legal framework is the so-called Entire
Agreement clause. This is a recurring clause in contract practice and
states that the document signed by the parties contains the whole
agreement and may not be supplemented by evidence of prior
statements or agreements.
The purpose of the Entire Agreement clause is to isolate the
contract from any source or element that may be external to the
document. This is also often emphasised by referring to the four
For a more extensive discussion and references, see INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3.
13
PEEL, supra note 11.
14
See infra notes 32-35.
12
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corners of the document as the borderline for the interpretation or
construction of the contract. The parties’ aim is thus to exclude that
the contract is integrated by terms or obligations that do not appear in
the document.
The parties are obviously entitled to regulate their interests and
to specify the sources of their regulation. However, many legal systems
provide for ancillary obligations deriving from the contract type,15 a
general principle of good faith,16 or a principle preventing an abuse of
rights.17 This means that a contract would always have to be
understood not only on the basis of the obligations that are spelled out
in it, but also in combination with the elements that, according to the
applicable law, integrate it. A contract, therefore, risks having different
content depending on the governing law: the Entire Agreement clause
is meant to avoid this uncertainty by barring the possibility of invoking
extrinsic elements. The Entire Agreement clause creates an illusion of
exhaustiveness of the written obligations.
This is, however, only an illusion: first of all, often ancillary
obligations created by the operation of law may not be excluded by the
contract.18 Moreover, some legal systems permit bringing evidence that
For France, see, Xavier Lagarde et al., The Romanistic Tradition:
Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under French Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note
10, § 2. For Italy, see Art. 1347 C.c. [Civil Code] (It.); Giorgio De Nova, The Romanistic
Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Italian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note
10, § 1, as well as the general considerations on Art. 1135 of the Civil Code in Section
1. For Denmark, see Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, The Nordic Tradition: Application of
Boilerplate Clauses Under Danish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1.
16
See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, §
242 (Ger.) (for the general principle on good faith in the performance of contracts);
see Gerhard Dannemann, Common Law Based Contracts Under German Law,
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, §§ 3.2-3.3 (for examples of its application by the
Courts).
17
See, for Russia, Ivan Zykin, The East European Tradition: Application of
Boilerplate Clauses Under Russian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1.
18
See, for France and Italy, supra note 15. For Finnish law, see Gustaf
Möller, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Finnish Law, in
15
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the parties’ agreement creates obligations different from those
contained in the contract.19 Furthermore, many civilian legal systems
openly permit the use of pre-contractual material to interpret the terms
written in the contract.20 Finally, a strict adherence to the clause’s
wording may, under some circumstances, be looked upon as
unsatisfactory even under English law, in spite of the formalistic
interpretation style that English law may employ in respect of other
clauses.21

BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1.
19
See, for Germany, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE]
§ 309, no. 12 (Ger.), prohibiting clauses which change the burden of proof to the
disadvantage of the other party; see Ulrich Magnus, The Germanic Tradition: Application
of Boilerplate Clauses Under German Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 5.1.1.a. Italy,
on the contrary, does not allow oral evidence that contradicts a written agreement.
See Giorgio De Nova, The Romanistic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under
Italian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 1.
20
In addition to Germany, supra note 19, see for France, Xavier Lagarde
et al., The Romanistic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under French Law, in
CORDERO-MOSS (ed.), supra note 10, § 2; for Italy, Giorgio De Nova, supra note
15, § 4; for Denmark, Peter Møgelvang-Hansen, The Nordic Tradition: Application of
Boilerplate Clauses Under Danish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1; for
Norway, Viggo Hagstrøm, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under
Norwegian Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 3.1; for Russia, Ivan Zykin,
The East European Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Russian Law, in
BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE
APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1. The situation seems to be more uncertain in
Sweden, see Lars Gorton, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under
Swedish Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 5.4.2.d, and more restrictive is Finland,
see Gustaf Möller, The Nordic Tradition: Application of Boilerplate Clauses Under Finnish
Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND
THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1.
21
See Edwin Peel, The Common Law Tradition: Application of Boilerplate
Clauses Under English Law, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10, § 2.1.

197

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

The effect of the clause, therefore, does not flow from its
simple words, but is the result of a combination of the clause and of
the governing law.
III.

TRANSNATIONAL LAW: A UNIFORM LEGAL FRAMEWORK?

We have seen above that contracts’ terms are not capable of
being interpreted without making reference to the applicable legal
framework. Even though arbitral tribunals in many situations are
allowed to consider exclusively the terms of the contract without
running the risk of triggering invalidity or unenforceability of the
award, they may find that the terms of the contract are not a sufficient
basis for the decision and must be integrated by external elements.
Admittedly, arbitration may (to a certain extent, as was seen in Section
1) be capable of giving effect to the regulation agreed to by the parties
in the contract without being obliged to comply with the peculiarities
of the applicable law. However, the terms of the contract are not selfexplanatory and have to be interpreted in light of the applicable legal
framework, as was seen in Section 2. That the arbitral tribunal is free
to interpret the contract and to decide how, if at all, the contract shall
interact with the applicable law, does not give an answer to the
question of how to interpret terms that are not self-explanatory. This
may result in different interpretations of the same contract terms
depending on the arbitrator’s background and inclination, and thus
impacts on party autonomy.
It is worthwhile exploring whether the idea of an absolute party
autonomy may be reinstated by including a uniform legal framework
into the closed circuit. It is often proposed that transnational sources
may give a uniform legal framework for international contracts.
Transnational sources are concerned with giving effect to commercial
practice without abiding by the peculiarities of the various legal
systems; this could be deemed to make national laws redundant.
The differences among the various national legal systems have
prompted various initiatives to formulate trans-national sets of rules,
in part developed spontaneously by business practice and in part
restated and codified by branch organizations, international
organisations, academic fora, etc. This complex of sources goes under
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various names, such as lex mercatoria, transnational law or soft law.22 If
transnational sources gave an exhaustive and harmonised regime, it
would be possible to include these sources as the only applicable legal
framework for the contract and thus reinstate the closed circuit.
As I argue elsewhere, however, transnational sources are not
sufficiently precise and systematic to replace national laws23 - not to
mention the formal circumstance that transnational sources may not,
as a matter of private international law, govern a contract to the
exclusion of any state laws.24 Some of the most recognized
transnational sources – in particular, the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (UPICC) and the Principles of
European Contract Law (PECL) – are heavily based on a general
principle of good faith.25 Good faith is a legal standard that needs
specification and there does not seem to be any generally
acknowledged legal standard of good faith that is sufficiently precise
to be applied uniformly, irrespective of the governing law.
Moreover, these instruments grant the interpreter much room
for interference regarding the wording of the contract – based on the
central role given to the principle of good faith. This seems to
contradict the very intention of standard contracts. International
contract practice is meant to be exhaustive and self-sufficient, and not
to be influenced by the interpreter’s legal tradition.26 Any correction by
principles such as good faith would run counter to the expectations of
the parties.

Literature on the subject matter is very vast. Among the works most
frequently referred to are FILIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX
MERCATORIA (1992); KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF
THE LEX MERCATORIA (2d. ed., 2010), and Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in
International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 747-768 (1985). For
extensive references see ROY GOODE ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW
– TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
23
For a more extensive discussion, see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS, supra note 9, §§ 2.4, 4.2.3.
24
For a more extensive discussion, see id. § 4.2.3.
25
For a more extensive discussion, see id. § 2.4.2.
26
For a more extensive discussion of the ambitions of self-sufficiency in
contract practice, id. ch. 1.
22
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The same applies to the instruments developed so far in the
ongoing work on a European contract law. The Academic Draft Frame
of Reference, the Acquis Principles, and the Common European Sales
Law (CESL), all largely based on the PECL, have a double approach
to commercial contracts: they extend rules of consumer protection to
commercial contracts (including an extensive and mandatory principle
of good faith), and then moderate them by reserving for contrary good
commercial practice. Reference to good commercial practice as the
only concretisation of the principle of good faith assumes that the
interpreter is in a position to define good commercial practice and to
assess its content. What constitutes good commercial practice,
however, is not clear. It may be assumed that it coincides with the
above mentioned spontaneous or academic transnational sources that
often are deemed to be particularly apt to govern international
contracts and that go under the name of transnational law or lex
mercatoria: scholarly works on the convergence of legal systems, general
principles, restatements, and trade usages. As will be seen, these
sources are not capable of giving a clear and harmonized picture of the
transnational law of commercial contracts; hence, they do not give a
clear picture of what good commercial practice is. Reference to good
commercial practice, therefore, does not create a concrete standard of
good faith.
Transnational sources, thus, do not always provide a uniform
solution. The arbitrator who is required to interpret contract terms will
not find a definitive and uniform standard of interpretation in these
sources, and will need to make recourse to other sources, thus
interrupting again the closed circuit.
A.

Interpretation of Force Majeure Clauses under Transnational
Law

To test the ability of transnational law to overcome the
disparity of legal traditions, we can look at the examples made in
Section 2 above. We saw that the expression “beyond the control” in
Force Majeure clauses may be interpreted differently depending on the
governing law. Does the transnational law offer a uniform solution?
One of the most successful instruments of harmonization of contract
law is the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), ratified by over sixty countries and looked
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upon, especially in some academic circles,27 as embodying principles
that are generally recognized and reach well beyond the convention’s
scope of application.
According to Article 79 of the CISG, a party is not liable for
failure to perform its obligations if it proves that the failure was due to
an impediment beyond its control that was unforeseeable and could
not reasonably have been overcome.
The CISG does not contain any reference to the diligence of
the affected party as criterion for exempting it from liability; in another
context, the convention confirms that diligence is not a criterion for
excuse: Articles 45(1)(b) and 61(1)(b) regulate that each party may
exercise contractual remedies for non-performance against the other
party without having to prove any fault or negligence or lack of good
faith on that party, nor do they mention that any evidence of diligence
would relieve the other party from its liability.
The Secretariat Commentary does not address the question of
how the criterion of the sphere of control shall be interpreted, whether
literally, or as a reference to the diligent conduct of the seller.28 Bearing
in mind that the CISG requires it to be interpreted autonomously,
without reference to domestic legal systems, it seems appropriate to
apply the literal interpretation and to see Article 79 as a reference to an
objective division of the landscape into two spheres, that of the seller
and that of the buyer, without reference to specific actual possibilities
to exercise control. This is confirmed by case law and doctrine, which
affirm that procurement risk falls within the sphere of risk of the seller,
and that therefore failure by the seller’s supplier is not deemed to fall
outside of the seller’s sphere of responsibility (unless the relevant good
has disappeared completely from the international market).29 In the
For a thorough analysis of the enormous impact of the CISG on
scholars, see THE CISG AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 436
(Franco Ferrari, ed., Sellier European Law Publishers, 2008). Ferrari also shows,
however, that the level of awareness about the CISG in the business community and
among practicing lawyers is strikingly low. Id. at 421.
28
Commentary On The Draft Convention On Contracts For The
International Sale Of Goods, Prepared By The Secretariat, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 1, 1979).
29
See Dionysios Flambouras, The Doctrines of Impossibility of Performance and
clausula rebus sic stantibus in the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
27
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comment to the second paragraph of article 79 on use of subcontractors, the Commentary specifies that this special rule does not
include suppliers of raw material or of goods to the seller.30
However, this is not the only way of understanding the
criterion of “beyond the control.” Article 79 of the CISG may be
interpreted differently, depending on the interpreter’s legal tradition –
something that has been defined as “troubling.”31
Norway implemented the CISG with the Sale of Goods Act.
The Sale of Goods Act, in Section 27, introduced the concept of
impediment beyond the control of the prevented party, with a literal
translation of Article 79 of the CISG.32 By introducing this concept,
the legislator intended to mitigate the then-existing regime, which was
based on strict liability.33
Norwegian legal doctrine interprets the criterion of “beyond
the control” not as having an abstract understanding of each party’s
sphere of control, but on the basis of the actual sphere of control of
each party.34 Only if one party actually has the possibility of influencing
a certain process are the events caused by that process deemed to be
within the sphere of control of that party. That a party has started a
process, in itself, does not mean that any events occurring in the course
of that process are in the sphere of control of that party. The test must
be if that party actually had the possibility of influencing the part of
the process in connection with which those events occurred. Hence,
in the case of procurement risk, the interpretation of what is “beyond
of Goods and the Principles of European Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis, 13 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 261, n.20 (2001). See also COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) art. 79, ¶¶ 11, 18, 37 (Schlechtriem
& Schwenzer, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (although ¶ 27 seems to embrace the
Germanic tradition).
30
See supra note 28, at 64.
31
Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, eds., supra note 29, art. 79, ¶ 11, at n.30.
32
Sale of Goods Act of 13 May 1988 §27 (Nor.).
33
Ot.prp. nr. 80 (1986–87), pp. 38 et seq. and, extensively on the
preparatory works in this context, Viggo Hagstrøm, Obligasjonsrett, § 19.4.2.
(Universitetsforlaget, 2d. ed., 2011).
34
See Hagstrøm, supra note 33. For a more extensive analysis, see Giuditta
Cordero-Moss, Lectures on comparative law of contracts, 166 Institutt for privatretts
stensilserie bd. 151 et. seq. (2004).
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the control” is opposite to the outcome under the CISG: the producer
chose its supplier, and this choice is certainly within the producer’s
sphere of control (it could have chosen another supplier, and then the
default would not have happened). However, the producer has no
actual possibility of influencing the performance of the supplier,
therefore any impediment in connection therewith is to be deemed
outside of its sphere of control.35
In conclusion, the CISG does not seem to provide a uniform
standard for the interpretation of Force Majeure clauses.
B.

Interpretation of Entire Agreement Clauses under
Transnational Law

The other example of contract term with inconsistent legal
effects made in Section 2 above, is the Entire Agreement clause.
This clause is recognised in Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC and
Article 2:105 of the PECL, with some restrictions: the provisions
specify that prior statements or agreements may be used to interpret
the contract. This is one of the applications of the general principle of
good faith; it is, however, unclear how far the principle of good faith
goes in overriding the clause inserted by the parties. If prior statements
and agreements may be used to interpret the contract, does this mean
that more terms may be added to the contract if, for example, the
parties have discussed certain specifications at length during the
negotiations and this has created in one of the parties the reasonable
35
Viggo Hagstrøm supra note 33, § 5.3. Hagstrøm’s interpretation is based
on a Supreme Court decision rendered in 1970, long before the implementation of
the CISG in the Norwegian system. However, the Supreme Court’s decision is still
referred to as correctly incorporating Norwegian law after the enactment of the Sales
of Goods Act, as the reference made by Hagstrøm confirms. See also Anders
Mikkelsen, HINDRINGSFRITAK 33 (Gyldendal, 2011). A Supreme Court decision
affirmed that liability is strict when the goods to be delivered are generic. See HR2004-00755-A-Rt-2004-675 (Supreme Court, Dom) (Nor.). The test will then be
whether the defects objectively are within the sphere of control of the seller. In this
context, therefore, the Supreme Court has rejected the test of actual control and is
more in line with the regulation contained in the CISG. This approach is consistent
with the German tradition, that distinguishes between generic obligations (where
liability is strict) and specific obligations (where the criterion of diligence applies).
This distinction was abandoned with the 2002 reform of the BGB.
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expectation that the specifications would be implied in the contract
even though they were not included in the final contract text? Article
1.8 of the UPICC would seem to indicate that this would be the
preferred approach under the UPICC. According to this provision, a
party may not act in a way inconsistent with reasonable expectations
that it has created in the other party. This is spelled out in the PECL,
Article 2:105, Paragraph 4, which states that, “[a] party may by its
statements or conduct be precluded from asserting a merger clause36
to the extent that the other party has reasonably relied on them.”
According to this logic, the detailed discussion during the
phase of negotiations of certain characteristics for the products may
create the reasonable expectation that those specifications have
become part of the agreement even if they were not written in the
contract; their subsequent exclusion on the basis of the Entire
Agreement clause may be deemed to be against good faith.
According to the opposite logic, however, the very fact that the
parties have excluded from the text of the contract some specifications
that were discussed during the negotiations, indicates that no
agreement was reached on those matters. Exclusion of those terms
from the contract, combined with the Entire Agreement clause,
strongly indicates the will of the parties not to be bound by those
specifications. Their subsequent inclusion on the basis of the good
faith principle would run counter to the parties’ intention.
The foregoing shows that the application of the UPICC and of
the PECL requires a specification of the principle of good faith. Is it
to be intended as an overriding principle, possibly creating, restricting
or modifying the obligations that flow from the text of the contract?
Or is it meant to take the text of the contract as a starting point,
ensuring that the obligations contained therein are enforced accurately
and precisely as the parties have envisaged them? This represents the
dichotomy between, on the one hand, the understanding of fairness as
a principle ensuring balance between the parties notwithstanding the
regulation on which the parties may have agreed, and, on the other
hand, the understanding of fairness as a principle ensuring
“Merger clause” is another definition of the Entire Agreement clause,
which may also be called the “Integration clause.”
36
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predictability, and leaving it to the parties to evaluate the desirability of
their contract regulation. This dichotomy characterises the different
approaches of the common law and the civilian tradition.37 To enhance
the ability of the UPICC to harmonize contract law, UNIDROIT has
created in 1992 a data base collecting court decisions and arbitral
awards on the various provisions of the UPICC. This is, therefore, the
best source to turn to when inquiring how to interpret the Entire
Agreement clause under the UPICC.
As of 2013, the Unilex database contained five decisions on
Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC. These decisions are not based on a
consistent understanding of the standard according to which the clause
shall be applied.38 The Unilex database shows two approaches to
Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC: one advocating the primacy of the
contract’s language, and the other assuming that the UPICC provides
for the primacy of the real intention of the parties, which in turn may
lead to considerably restricting the effect of the Entire Agreement
clause. Evidently, this is not sufficient to give guidance as to which
approach to choose when addressing the conflict between the
contract’s language and the principle of good faith. This leaves so
much room to the discretion of the interpreter that it seems unlikely
for Article 2.1.17 of the UPICC to give a harmonized regulation of its
subject-matter. The UPICC, therefore, does not contribute
considerably to a harmonized standard of interpretation.
IV.

ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS: FAITHFUL TO THE INTENTION OF THE
PARTIES

Above we have seen that the arbitral tribunal may, to a large
(but not unlimited) extent, disregard the governing law without
consequences for the validity and enforceability of the award; we have
also seen that this is not a sufficient answer to the question of how to
interpret terms of the contract that are not self-explanatory; we have
further seen that it is not always possible to find a uniform standard of
interpretation in translation sources. A principle that is often invoked

For a more extensive discussion, see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3.
38
Id. § 2.4.2.1.
37
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in these circumstances is that the arbitral tribunal has a duty to be
faithful to the will of the parties.
Does a duty to be faithful to the will of the parties give
sufficient guidelines?
The arbitral tribunal may certainly not be inclined to let the
terms of the contract be overridden by the formalities of the various
national legal systems, but that does not give an answer to the question
of how contract terms shall be interpreted.
We can assume a long-term loan agreement with an Early
Termination clause permitting immediate termination of the contract
and consequently the immediate repayment of the whole principal
upon breach of the obligations contained in a certain clause.
A literal interpretation of the Early Termination clause permits
termination even when the breach is insignificant – for example, when
the borrower has submitted its financial statements to the lender with
one-day delay.39 The breach may have had no consequences on the
borrower’s creditworthiness, on its ability to repay the loan, or on the
lender’s ability to verify these matters; the real reason for the lender to
terminate the loan may have been that the interest rates had increased
since the time of signing the loan, and that the lender considered the
threat of early termination as effective leverage for negotiating a higher
interest rate. This would not be relevant in a literal interpretation: the
clause would be considered applicable without regard to the real
reasons for which it is invoked.
A purposive interpretation of the clause takes into
consideration the purpose of the clause and tries to assess whether the
particular situation may be deemed to fall into the scope of the clause.
This may lead to considering the clause as not applicable in a situation
where the reasons for which it is invoked do not correspond to the
purpose of the clause.

The borrower’s obligation to submit its financial statements is usually
in loan agreements and is generally to be found in the section of the so-called
covenants. It is meant to make it possible for the lender to control the borrower’s
continued creditworthiness.
39
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What is more faithful to the intention of the parties: a literal
implementation of the clauses that may permit speculative or abusive
conduct or an integration of the clauses with considerations of
business purpose, good faith, and trade usages? There seems to be no
absolute answer to the question of what interpretation better meets the
expectations of the parties: a strictly literal interpretation of the terms
of the contract, or an integration of the contract with principles of
good faith and commercial sense based on law, trade usages,
transnational principles or other sources. The former would better
reflect the parties’ expectations if it is assumed that the parties have
consciously intended to achieve specific legal effects with each and
every of the words that they have written in the contract. This,
however, does not reflect the reality of how contracts are drafted and
negotiated, as will be seen below.
A.

The Dynamics of Contract Drafting

Often, some of the clauses in a contract are inserted without
the parties having given any particular consideration to their content
or their effects under the applicable law.40 This practice may be
surprising, considering the importance that the governing law has for
the application and even the effectiveness of contract terms, as was
seen above. However, the practice of negotiating detailed wording
without regard to the governing law, or even of inserting contract
clauses without having negotiated them, is not necessarily always
unreasonable. From a merely legal point of view, it makes little sense,
but from the overall economic perspective, it is more understandable.
The gap between the parties’ reliance on the self-sufficiency of the
contract and the actual legal effects of the contract under the governing
law does not necessarily derive from the parties’ lack of awareness
regarding the legal framework surrounding the contract. More
precisely, the parties may often be aware of the fact that they are
unaware of the legal framework for the contract. The possibility that
the wording of the contract is interpreted and applied differently from

A more extensive analysis of the practice of contract drafting is made
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 1.
40
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what a literal application would seem to suggest may be accepted by
some parties as a calculated risk.41
Considerations regarding the internal organization of the
parties are also a part of the assessment of risk. In large multinational
companies, risk management may require a certain standardization,
which in turn prevents a high degree of flexibility in drafting the single
contracts. In balancing the conflicting interests of ensuring internal
standardization and permitting local adjustment, large organizations
may prefer to enhance the former.42 It is, in other words, not
necessarily the result of thoughtlessness if a contract is drafted without
having regard for the governing law. Neither is it a symptom of a
refusal of the applicability of national laws. It is the result of a cost–
benefit evaluation, leading to the acceptance of a calculated legal risk.
The sophisticated party, aware of the implications of adopting contract
models that are not adjusted to the governing law and consciously
assessing the connected risk, will identify the clauses that matter the
most, and concentrate its negotiations on those, leaving the other
clauses untouched and accepting the corresponding risk.
A faithful interpretation of the contract assumes an
understanding of this uneven approach to contract drafting.
B.

The Need for Predictability

On the other hand, predictability is extremely important in
commercial contracts. The parties are interested in enforcing their
rights, and, for this purpose, they depend on one or more national legal
systems and their courts. Therefore, once a contract is finalized, parties
are interested in its enforceability and in the predictability of the
parameters according to which enforcement may be achieved.43

41
See more extensively David Echenberg, Negotiating International
Contracts: Does the Process Invite a Review of Standard Contracts from the Point of View of
National Legal Requirements?, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW, supra note 10.
42
See more extensively, Maria Celeste Vettese, Multinational Companies and
National Contracts, in BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW , supra note 10.
43
See QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY:
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Litigation lawyers carefully analyse the specific contract and its
effects under the governing law and try to assess as precisely as possible
the possibility of winning a case in court or in arbitration on the basis
of the contract wording, the applicable law and the degree of factual
background that the governing law allows to bring into the dispute.
Thus, on the one hand, drafting lawyers, while negotiating a contract,
may have willingly disregarded the legal effects of some clauses. On
the other hand, litigation lawyers, while assessing enforceability of the
same contract, will carefully study its legal effects under the governing
law. The varying degree of awareness during negotiations, thus, must
be considered in light of the need for predictability once a dispute
arises.
Furthermore, contracts are often meant to circulate, for
example, because they are assigned to third parties, are used as security,
or serve as a basis for calculating insurance premiums. In these
situations, it is essential that contracts are interpreted strictly in
accordance with their terms: third parties are not aware of and should
not be assumed to take into consideration the relationship between the
original parties to the contract, what the original parties may have
assumed or intended, or any circumstances that relate to the original
parties and that may have had an impact on these parties’ interests. It
is, therefore, expected that a contract is interpreted primarily, if not
exclusively, in light of its terms – without considering things such as
what a fair balance between the parties’ interests would be or what one
party’s expectations might have been.
C.

How to Square the Circle: The Applicable Law

The arbitral tribunal is, therefore, expected to understand the
dynamics of negotiations in order to properly give effect to the
intention of the parties. Blindly applying the wording of the contract
without any regard to the principles of the governing law or, to the
extent that they are determinable and applicable, of transnational law,
would not necessarily reflect the true intention of the parties if the
clause that is being applied literally is one of the boilerplate clauses that
CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 13 (2010). See also THE LAW SOCIETY, LAW SOCIETY REPORT: FIRMS’
CROSS-BORDER WORK 1, 8 (2010). For further references, see INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, § 2.1.
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the parties did not consider. Integrating or correcting a clause with
national or transnational principles, on the other hand, might not
necessarily reflect the parties’ intention either, if the clause that is being
interpreted is one of the clauses that the parties carefully negotiated.
Leaving broad discretion to the interpreter, however, runs the
risk of undermining predictability, if the criteria for exercising such
discretion are not clearly determinable. As was seen above,
interpretation of the contract should take into consideration the need
for predictability. Overriding the terms of the contract in the name of
principles of good faith or equity, thus, would lead to results that are
not compatible with the expectations of international business
practice, if the standards that are applied are not clearly determinable.
From the overview made in Section 3 above, it seems that the standard
of good faith is not sufficiently determinable on a transnational level.
This seems to speak for the advisability of taking into consideration
the criteria developed in the applicable law.
D.

Variety of Approaches

There is no uniform answer to the question of what
interpretation is the most faithful to the parties’ intentions. A seminar
organised at the University of Oslo in 201144 discussed the arbitrators’
approach to the interpretation of contracts and identified a variety of
approaches.45 The results of this seminar are summarised below.
Contracts are not necessarily always applied in strict
accordance with their terms. There are different degrees of
interference and the sources of the interference also vary quite
considerably. There is a scale moving from a strict application of the
governing law to integrate the contract, via interpretation of the
contract terms in the context of transnational soft law principles such
44
See Arbitration and Party Autonomy (APA), supra note 9. The
programme for the seminar, the list of panel participants and the transcript from the
panel
discussions
are
available
at
http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/choice-oflaw/events/2011/2011-arbitration-and-the-not-unlimited-party-autonomy.html.
45
See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 9, ch. 3, §
7; see also Giuditta Cordero-Moss, Interpretation of Contracts in International Commercial
Arbitration: Diversity on More than One Level, 22 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 13, 13-36 (2014).
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as the UPICC and the PECL (which are heavily based on the principle
of good faith and may give rise to a substantial possibility of interfering
with the contract language), to interpretation of the contract on the
basis of its own terms combined with the parties’ interests and trade
usages, to interpretation of the contract solely on the basis of its own
terms. There is also a further approach to interpretation of the
contract, which goes under the label of “splitting the baby.” This
Solomonic approach consists of rendering an award in the middle
range between the claims of each of the parties. This is not necessarily
based on a literal consideration of the contract terms or on an
integration of the contract with other sources, but simply on the desire
to accommodate both parties.46 Interestingly, there does not seem to
be a uniform perception of the frequency of this approach: a recent
empirical study shows that the parties to arbitration perceive that they
got a Solomonic award in 18–20% of the cases, whereas the arbitrators
perceive that they take this kind of equitable decision in only 5% of the
cases.47 This, therefore, adds a new variable to the equation of the
interpretation of contracts. Not only is it uncertain whether the
arbitrators will interpret the contract literally, whether they will use
sources of law, or whether they will apply transnational principles to
give a more purposive interpretation, but it is also possible that the
decision will be influenced by equitable considerations that are not
based on the contract or on other legal sources.
CONCLUSION
Party autonomy is limited in international arbitration, in spite
of the widespread opinion that contracts are self-sufficient and that,
together with arbitration, they create a closed circuit that manages to
leave national law out.
First of all, the legal framework for arbitration ensures that
arbitration enjoys a significant autonomy, but this autonomy is not
unlimited. If the losing party decides not to comply with the arbitral
This appears in the 2012 Survey of the School of International
Arbitration of Queen Mary University of London. QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF
LONDON AND WHITE & CASE, 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY:
CURRENT AND PREFERRED PRACTICES IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS § 7 (2012).
47
Queen Mary University, supra note 46, at 38.
46
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award, courts of law may exercise judicial control. Judicial control on
arbitration is restricted, but there is room for overriding party
autonomy in several respects.
Furthermore, even within the area where no judicial control
may be exercised and arbitration is autonomous, the necessity may
arise to integrate contract terms with external sources. Contract terms
do not always have an absolute meaning with legal effects flowing
directly from the words, and recourse to a legal framework may be
required to interpret the terms and to define their legal effects. To the
extent that transnational sources provide a uniform legal framework,
they may integrate the contract and reinstate self-sufficiency. Where
transnational sources are not sufficient, however, the arbitral tribunal
will have to integrate the contract with external principles and rules,
primarily stemming from the governing law.
All the above constitutes limitations to party autonomy in
arbitration.
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